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Since 1998, large investment banks have ﬂooded the European capital markets
with issues of call warrants. This has led to a unique situation in the Nether-
lands, where now call warrants, traded on the stock exchange, and long-term
call options, traded on the options exchange, exist. Both entitle their holders
to buy shares of common stock. We use the long-term call options in order
to price the call warrants. Using the model of Black and Scholes (1973), the
Square Root model version of the Constant Elasticity of Variance model of Cox
and Ross (1976), and the Binomial model of Cox et al. (1979) we ﬁnd that
the call warrants are strongly overvalued during the ﬁrst ﬁve trading days. The
average overvaluation is between 25 and 30 percent for all three models. Only
a small part of this overvaluation can be explained by rational arguments such
as transaction costs. We conclude that the overvaluation can be attributed to
a behavioral preference of private investors for call warrants.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since 1998 the European capital markets have been ﬂooded with a large number
of issues of call warrants. Three large international investment banks, i.e. the
American Citibank, the German Commerzbank, and the French Societe Gen-
erale Acceptance, have made most of these issues. Call warrants are especially
popular in European countries with less developed options exchanges. In March
2000, no less than 8,000 diﬀerent call warrants were outstanding on German
exchanges1. According to the Dutch ﬁnancial newspaper Het Financieele Dag-
blad of January 24, 2002 in October 2001, 830 call warrants were outstanding
on Euronext Brussels and even 4,952 on Euronext Paris2. The popularity of
call warrants is also large in the Netherlands. The last mentioned article in
Het Financieele Dagblad mentions that in October 2001 no less than 1,047 call
warrants were outstanding on Euronext Amsterdam. This is remarkable, since
the Netherlands has a very large options exchange that has been operational
since the 1970s. In November 2001 the German Commerzbank estimated the
total value of call warrants issued on the European exchanges to be more than
200 billion US dollars. This has led to an interesting situation in the Nether-
lands. Call warrants are traded in a special segment of the stock exchange,
Euronext Amsterdam. Besides that, long-term call options are traded on the
options exchange of Amsterdam, the Euronext Derivatives Market of Amster-
dam. In many cases, the call warrants and the call options entitle their holders
to buy the same common stocks. Since the call warrants and the call options
are almost identical, they should carry the same prices. However, in the ﬁnan-
cial press it is regularly suggested that call warrants are overvalued compared
to call options on the same stock3. We test whether this is really the case by
studying the pricing of call warrants given the prices of long-term call options.
Furthermore, we study which factors can be responsible for a diﬀerent pricing
of call warrants and call options. The ﬁnancial press also regularly suggests
that investors perceive call warrants being diﬀerent from call options. This is
based on the diﬀerent image that call warrants have compared to call options.
Our null hypothesis is that call warrants and call options are priced eﬃciently
in relation to each other. That is, in so far as there are price diﬀerences be-
tween call warrants and call options, they can be explained by rational factors
such as transaction costs. Our alternative hypothesis is that the price diﬀerence
between call warrants and call options can be explained by behavioral factors.
Call warrants are series of call options issued by banks on speciﬁc underlying
values. The name warrant is misleading as they are traditionally deﬁned as
rights issued by a company to buy a certain number of new shares in this
company during a speciﬁc period (the exercise period) at a speciﬁc price (the
exercise price)4. Another party than the company of the underlying shares
1Source the Dutch ﬁnancial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad of March 18, 2000.
2Euronext Brussels and Paris are the respective stock exchanges of Brussels and Paris
that, together with the stock exchange of Amsterdam Euronext Amsterdam, have merged
into Euronext.
3See e.g. Het Financieele Dagblad of June 20, 1998: ”Beurshausse leidt tot te dure war-
rants” (transl. Bull market leads to overpriced warrants) or Het Financieele Dagblad of June
16, 2001: ”Warrant belegger moet op de kleintjes letten” (transl. Warrant investor should
watch his steps).
4See e.g. Galai (1977).
1generally issues call warrants. Moreover they entitle the holder to buy or sell
existing shares rather than new shares. Call warrants are also diﬀerent from
options-exchange call options, from now on to be referred to as call options.
Diﬀerences include the fact that the number of contracts is ﬁxed, the credit
risk is not borne by the clearing house of the options exchange and it is not
possible for other parties to write call warrants. In the remainder of this paper
we will refer to these call warrants either by the term ”call warrant” or simply
”warrant”. The securities that are traditionally referred to as warrants will from
now on by referred to as ”traditional warrants”.
The history of call warrants in the Netherlands started in 1986 with the
issuance of so-called FALCONS Royal Dutch by Robeco5. After this ﬁrst issue
they were issued under a number of diﬀerent names in the Netherlands, such
as covered warrants and EAGLES6. In the period of 1986 until 1997 only 32
call warrants were issued in the Netherlands7. The issuance of call warrants
really took oﬀ in June 1998 with the issuance of a number of call warrants by
the German Commerzbank. The call warrants issued since then have diﬀer-
ent underlying values. These include large Dutch stocks, large foreign stocks
(e.g. Nokia and Amazon.com), national and international indexes (e.g. the
DAX index and the Nikkei index), and baskets of stocks. The market for call
warrants in the Netherlands is strongly dominated by a few large banks. For
example, according to the oﬃcial newspaper of Euronext Amsterdam, De Oﬃ-
ciële Prijscourant van de Eﬀectenbeurs, on November 13, 2001 in total 877 call
warrants were outstanding. Of these call warrants, 94 (11%) were issued by the
Dutch ABNAmro Bank, 85 (10%) were issued by the American Citibank, 291
(33%) were issued by the German Commerzbank and 361 (44%) were issued by
the French Societe Generale Acceptance. The remaining 46 (5%) call warrants
were issued by a number of smaller parties, mainly other Dutch banks. This
underlines the international character of the market for call warrants.
Despite the large extent of the market for call warrants, there is hardly any
empirical research available on the pricing of these securities. Veld and Verboven
(1995) compare the prices of Dutch equity warrants and long-term call options.
They ﬁnd that the equity warrants are systematically overpriced compared to
the long-term call options. However, the equity warrants in their comparison
are mostly traditional equity warrants. Only one of the warrants in their sample
was a call warrant as described above. Chan and Pinder (2000) compare the
pricing of call warrants and call options on the Australian market. They ﬁnd
that warrants are 1.30 to 5.02% overpriced to electronically traded options and
that they are 7.50 to 10.63% overpriced compared to ﬂoor-traded options. From
their empirical analysis they conclude that the overpricing of warrants compared
to options can be explained by the liquidity premium in the warrant market.
The most important result of our study is that on the ﬁrst ﬁve trading days,
the call warrants were on average overvalued by more than 30%. This result
holds for all three models that we test, i.e. the model of Black and Scholes
(1973), the Square Root version of the Constant Elasticity of Variance model
of Cox and Ross (1976), both corrected for continuous dividend payments, and
5F A L C O N Si sa na b b r e v i a t i o no f” F i x e dT e r mA g r e e m e n t sf o rL o n gT e r mC a l lO p t i o n s
on Existing Securities”.
6EAGLES is an abbreviation of ”Euro-issued American-style Geared Letters Exchangeable
for Shares”.
7See Duﬀhues and Veld (1997) for an overview.
2the Binomial model of Cox et al. (1979) with discrete dividend payments.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that 99% of the warrants are overvalued. A small part of
the overvaluation can be explained from the diﬀerence in transaction costs. It
is not possible to arbitrage the overvaluation away, since it is not possible to
short the warrants8. However, it still remains strange that investors are willing
to pay much more for call warrants than for almost identical call options. We
conclude that the overvaluation can be explained by a behavioral preference of
private investors for call warrants.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the methodology and the data set. In Section 3 the most important results
are discussed. The possible explanations for the overvaluation are presented in
Section 4. In Section 5 we present the results of a questionnaire that we have sent
to the CentERpanel of CentERdata. This panel consists of 2,000 households in
the Netherlands that are weekly surveyed on a variety of subjects. The paper
concludes with Section 6 in which the summary and conclusions are presented.
2 Data description and methodology
2.1 Methodology
The methodology that we use in this paper consists of the comparison of model
and market prices on the issuance date and the immediate period thereafter
of the call warrants. Previous empirical research on the pricing of traditional
warrants generally concludes that the model of Black and Scholes (1973) and
the Square Root model of Cox and Ross (1976), both corrected for dividend
payments, are the most suitable models for the pricing of traditional warrants9.
Both call warrants and traditional warrants are in fact long-term call options.
For that reason it is likely that the models that are suitable for the pricing of
traditional warrants are also most ﬁt for the pricing of call warrants10.
Both the Black/Scholes and the Square Root model are special cases of the
Constant Elasticity of Variance model (CEV-model). In the CEV-model, the
price of the underlying common stock is assumed to follow a constant elasticity
of variance process, which has the form:
dS/S = µdt + δS(Ψ−2)/2dZ,
where:
S = price of the underlying stock;
µ =e x p e c t e dr a t eo fr e t u r no nt h es t o c k ;
Ψ = elasticity factor;
Z = Wiener process.
8The reason for this is that the exchange does not allow short positions in call warrants.
9See e.g. Shastri and Sirodom (1995), Lauterbach and Schultz (1990), and Hauser and
Lauterbach (1996, 1997). A complete overview of empirical research on warrant pricing can
be found in Veld (2002).
10An important diﬀerence between traditional warrants and call warrants is that the exercise
of a traditional warrant leads to the creation of new shares. Research of Schulz and Trautmann
(1994) has shown that this eﬀect can be ignored when pricing traditional warrants.
3The instantaneous standard deviation of the percentage return (or volatility),
σ, is given by the equation:
σ = δS(Ψ−2)/2
When Ψ equals 2, the volatility is a constant, δ, and the stochastic process
generating returns is a lognormal diﬀusion process, the process assumed in the
Black/Scholes option-pricing model.
Cox and Ross (1976) drop the assumption of a constant volatility and instead
focus their attention on the case that: 0 ≤ Ψ < 2. In this case the volatility
decreases as the stock price increases. This inverse relationship can especially
be explained by ﬁnancial leverage arguments. As the stock price falls, the
market value of the ﬁrm’s debt will also fall because of an increased perception
of bankruptcy. The decrease in the market value of equity will be larger than
the decrease in the market value of debt, which produces a rise in the ﬁrm’s
debt-to-equity ratio. This increase in ﬁnancial leverage causes an increase in
the risk of the equity, which leads to a rise in the stock’s volatility. According
to Beckers (1980) a similar eﬀect can be observed if the ﬁrm has almost no
debt. Since every ﬁrm faces ﬁxed costs, which have to be met irrespective of
its income, a decrease in income will decrease the value of the ﬁrm and at the
same time increase its riskiness.
As a special case of the general CEV-model, Cox and Ross (1976) present
the Square Root model, this model has a parameter value Ψ of 1. The formula
for the Square Root model can be derived from by substituting the value 1 for
the factor Ψ in the general equation of the CEV-model. This model is called the
Square Root model because it assumes that the volatility is inversely related to
the square root of the stock value.
As mentioned above, we use both the models of Black and Scholes (1973)
and the Square Root model of Cox and Ross (1976) for the calculation of call
warrant model prices. Given the long maturity of the call warrants we use
dividend corrected versions of both models. Dividends are assumed to be paid
continuously as ﬁrst derived by Merton (1973). When we refer to the model
of Black and Scholes (1973) or the Square Root model of Cox and Ross (1976)
in the remainder of this paper, we mean the versions of these models that are
corrected for continuous dividend payments. Both the call warrants and the
call options are American that is they can be exercised from the issuance date
until the expiration date. Merton (1973) has shown that it can be rational to
exercise an American call option (warrant) before an ex-dividend date. This
eﬀect is not incorporated in the model of Black and Scholes (1973) and the
Square Root model. For this reason we also use the Binomial model of Cox
et al. (1979). In the limit case this model converges into the model of Black
and Scholes (1973). The advantage of the Binomial model is that it allows the
incorporation of discrete dividend payments, thus allowing for the possibility of
early exercise.
2.2 Data description
We analyze the prices of call warrants that were issued on Euronext Amsterdam
in the period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001. Call warrants are
identiﬁed from the Dutch ﬁnancial newspaper De Oﬃciële Prijscourant van
4de Eﬀectenbeurs, an oﬃcial publication of the stock and options exchanges in
Amsterdam. Information on the warrants expiration date, exercise price and
the warrant-ratio (this is the number of warrants that are needed to buy one
share of common stock) are all derived from Datastream. The warrants are
issued by trade. Therefore, there is no explicit issue price for the warrants.
The banks generally publish indicative issue prices, however they do not bind
them. The actual issue price is the ﬁrst trading price of the warrants. In order
to avoid our research to be dominated by outliers we use information on the
ﬁrst ﬁve days that the warrants are traded. A trading day is deﬁned as a day
on which Datastream reports a positive trading volume for the warrant. We
restrict ourselves to the analysis of call warrants on individual companies for
which there are also long-term call options outstanding on the options exchange
in Amsterdam. In the period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001 we
identify a total of 275 call warrants for which there are also long-term call
options outstanding.
2.3 Estimation of the variables
All three models require six variables. The ﬁrst four variables are the same
for all three models, i.e. (1) the price of the underlying stock (S); (2) the
exercise price (X); (3) the remaining time to maturity (T), and (4) the risk-
free interest rate (r). Variables (1), (2) and (3) can be observed directly. The
fourth variable, the risk-free interest rate can be approximated as the average
yield on a government bond with the same maturity as the call warrant. Since
all call warrants have a maturity that is around 2 years, we estimate the risk-
free interest rate as the average yield on government bonds with a maturity of 2
years11. In addition, the model of Black and Scholes (1973) and the Square Root
model require the dividend yield. This is also available from Datastream. The
Binomial model requires the discrete dividend payment (D) that will be paid
during its remaining maturity. We estimate the discrete dividend as the last
dividend payment before the ﬁrst trading date. This discrete dividend is also
obtained from Datastream12. The ﬁnal variable that has to be estimated for all
three models is the standard deviation of the returns on the underlying stocks,
commonly referred to as the volatility. We use the implied standard deviations
of long-term call options that are traded on the same stocks in order to estimate
this variable. There is a problem here in the sense that usually the maturity and
the exercise price of the call warrants are diﬀerent from the maturity and the
exercise price of the long-term call options. This causes a problem because the
volatility is diﬀerent between maturities. Brenner and Subrahmanyam (1988)
refer to this phenomenon as the ”term structure of volatility”. Besides that,
Hull (2003, page 334-336) notes that volatilities for equity options are diﬀerent
between exercise prices. In general, the volatility decreases as the exercise price
increases. The volatility used to price a low- exercise price option is signiﬁcantly
higher than that used to price a high-exercise price option. In order to calculate
11See e.g. Hull (2003, page 247) for a justiﬁcation of this estimate of the risk-free interest
rate. A number of other option pricing studies use the same estimate, see e.g. Roberts et al.
(2002).
12In reality dividend payments show a growing pattern. However, it is diﬃcult to derive an
o b j e c t i v eg r o w t hr a t ef o rt h ed i v i d e n dp a y m e n t .W eh a v ee x p e r i m e n t e dw i t hs e v e r a lg r o w t h
rates and we ﬁnd that our results are fairly robust if we use a growth rate instead of a constant
dividend payment. These results are on request available from the authors.
5a useful volatility we use a ”volatility surface” in the spirit of Hull (2003, page
336-337). All of the above mentioned variables are acquired from Datastream.
The following example illustrates our procedure for the calculation of a weighed
implied volatility.
Example:
By means of example we look at the warrant ”Ahold”. The underlying stock
of this warrant is the share ”Ahold”. The following information is known about
this warrant:
Issue date: March 6, 2000
Exercise date: March 25, 2002
Exercise price (X): 25 Euro
Number of shares per warrant: 10
Time-to-maturity (T): 2.03 year
First day of trade with positive volume: March 13, 2000
Closing price on ﬁrst trading day: 0.47 Euro
Share price (S): 22.8 Euro
Interest rate (r): 4.55%
Dividend yield (g): 2.15%
On March 13, 2000 a large number of call options on the shares of Ahold
are outstanding on the options exchange. We select the call options that are
closest to the call warrants in terms of the exercise price and the remaining time
to maturity. Two of these options have an exercise price that is lower than the
exercise price of the call warrants. Two other options have an exercise price that
is equal to or higher than the exercise price of the call warrants. At the same
time, two of the options have a remaining time to maturity that is shorter than
that of the warrants and two others have a remaining time to maturity that is
equal to or longer than that of the warrants. With regard to these options we
calculate implied volatilities using the model of Black and Scholes (1973):
Call oct01 X1 = 22.70 T1 = 1.60 year price = 4.70 imp1 vol: 39.12%
Call oct01 X2 = 31 T2 = 1.60 year price = 1.85 imp2 vol: 35.13%
Call oct02 X3 = 22.70 T3 = 2.60 year price = 5.95 imp3 vol: 39.57%
Call oct02 X4 = 29.50 T4 = 2.60 year price = 3.50 imp4 vol: 36.53%
The following equations are used in order to arrive at a weighted implied






















shortvol represents the calculation of the implied volatility of the short-
term options and longvol represents the calculation of the implied volatility of
6the long-term options, and wghtimp represents the calculation of the weighted
implied volatility of the two series.





















∗ 0.3801 = 0.3823
Using this weighted implied volatility we calculated the model price of the
warrant. This appears to be 43.21 Eurocents, while the market price is 47
Eurocents. Therefore, we conclude that this warrant is overpriced.
2.4 Sample selection
The selection of the ﬁnal sample is presented in Table 1.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
The research is restricted to call warrants that were issued in the period from
January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001. Only warrants on underlying shares on
which also long term call options are available are taken into account. In total
275 call warrants fulﬁll this condition. Price data are derived from Datastream.
With regard to 35 call warrants no information is available in Datastream.
Therefore these warrants are eliminated from our sample. The information
on the warrants conditions is also derived from Datastream. This information
is veriﬁed using the original issuance prospectuses of the call warrants. The
latter are available on the website of Euronext Amsterdam (aex.nl) and on
the websites of the issuing banks. In ﬁve cases we ﬁnd conﬂicting information
between Datastream and the issuance prospectuses. Since it is not possible to
retrieve the correct information at the issuance dates, we eliminate these ﬁve
observations. A problem that may occur is that the option, warrant and stock
markets are not synchronous on the ﬁrst trading day of the warrant. In other
words, the last trade of the warrant, the option and the stock will probably occur
at diﬀerent times. In order to minimize this problem we average the diﬀerence
between the market and model prices of each warrant for the ﬁrst ﬁve trading
days. A trading day is deﬁned as a day on which the trading volume of the
warrant is positive. Trading days are only taken into account if at least one call
option with a longer maturity and one call option with a shorter maturity than
the warrant are traded, i.e. have a positive trading volume. This leads to the
elimination of 28 observations. Warrants are only included if during the ﬁrst 10
t r a d i n gd a y sa tl e a s tﬁ v ed a y sc a nb ef o u n do nw h i c ht h ee a r l i e rm e n t i o n e dt w o
options are traded. This leads to the elimination of 96 observations. The ﬁnal
sample consists of 111 observations. It should be noted that four underlying
stocks are not included at all in the ﬁnal sample. This is mostly caused by the
fact that there is not enough liquidity in the options. Therefore there are not
enough warrant trading days on which also options are being traded.
72.5 Summary statistics
The summary statistics of our sample are presented in Table 2.
[Please insert Table 2 here]
In Table 2 the summary statistics are presented for the diﬀerent issuers. All
call warrants in our sample are issued by either the Dutch ABNAmro bank
or by one the following foreign issuers: Citibank, Commerzbank and Societe
Generale Acceptance. ABNAmro bank is referred to as issuer A. The foreign
issuers are indicated as B to D. The average warrant price in Panel A, based
on a warrant-ratio of 0.1, is 0.55. The average maturity of the call warrants is
close to 2 years (1.71 years). The average warrant-ratio is 0.13. On the trading
days, the warrants are actively traded, with an average trading volume of 7,518
warrants and a median of 4,000 warrants. In Panel B the summary statistics
are presented for the warrants that are priced with four options13.T h er e s u l t s
i nP a n e lBa r el a r g e l yt h es a m ea si nP a n e lA .
3 Results
The overvaluation of each warrant is calculated as:
Overvaluation =( ( marketprice − modelprice)/modelprice) ∗ 100%
If the outcome of this calculation is smaller than 0, there is of course no
overvaluation, but an undervaluation instead.
The overvaluation is ﬁrst calculated for the model of Black and Scholes
(1973). As mentioned before, this model is corrected for continuous dividend
payments according to the method presented by Merton (1973). The overvalu-
ation per underlying share is presented in Table 3.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
In Panel A the overvaluation is presented for the whole sample. From this
panel it can be concluded that on average warrants are overvalued with more
than 31%. The average overvaluation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the
1%-level. It has to be noticed that the overvaluation is not only statistically, but
also economically signiﬁcant. The pricing of the call warrants is not based on
some historical estimate for the volatility, but is based on the implied volatility
of long-term call options that have similar exercise prices and maturities as
the call warrants. In this context an overpricing of more than 31% is very
remarkable. If we look at the individual underlying stocks, we see that the
overpricing is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%-level for all stocks for
which at least four observations are available. The median overvaluation from
Panel A is 26%. This is also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%-level14.
In total 110 out of 111 warrants (99%) are overvalued. The total range runs
13The sub-sample includes the warrants for which on at least one of the ﬁve trading days
at least four options are available.
14The signiﬁcance of the medians is tested using the Binomial sign test.
8from an undervaluation of 10% to an overvaluation of 138%. The results in
Panel A are partly caused by some large outliers. Some of these may be caused
by the use of less than four options for the pricing of the call warrants. In
such cases, the possibility exists that the warrants are priced using implied
standard deviations from options that have much higher or much lower exercise
prices. For this reason we present separate results for the warrants that are
priced with four options. These results are included in Panel B. The average
overvaluation in Panel B is somewhat lower, but is still more than 29%. The
median overvaluation drops to 25%. This median is still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 1%-level. In Table 4 the overpricing is presented for the Square
Root model. This model is also corrected for continuous dividend payments.
[Please insert Table 4 here]
The results for the Square Root model strongly resemble the results for the
Black/Scholes model. In Panel A we can see that the average overpricing is more
than 38%. The average overpricing is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1%-
level. The individual stocks, for which at least four observations are available,
are also overpriced. In all cases, the overpricing is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1%-level. The median overpricing is 30% and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 1%-level. The results for the Square Root model show even
more variation than the Black/Scholes model for warrants that are priced using
less than four options. In Panel B we present the results for the warrants that
are valued with 4 options. The average overpricing decreases to 30%. The
median overpricing for the sub-sample is 28%.
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by the use of a con-
tinuous dividend yield, rather than discrete dividend payment, we have also
calculated the overpricing for the Binomial model of Cox et al. (1979). In
theses calculations we include discrete dividend payments in the model. The
results for this model are included in Table 5.
[Please insert Table 5 here]
The results for both panels in Table 5 conﬁrm the earlier results for the
Black/Scholes and the Square Root models. The average overpricing for the
whole sample is more than 29%. This overpricing is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1%-level. The average overpricing for the sub-sample of warrants
that are priced using four options is 28%. This average is also diﬀerent from
zero at the 1%-level. The median overpricing for the whole sample and the
sub-sample are respectively 26% and 24%. Both are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1%-level.
4 Possible explanations for the overvaluation
4.1 The issuer’s perspective
The arrangement between the warrant issuing parties and Euronext Amsterdam
is such that the issuing parties pay a price of 5 Eurocents to Euronext each time
that they change the price of the warrant. The fact that the issuer has to pay
Euronext for each price change gives an incentive for the issuing party to keep
9their prices constant. Given this need for constant prices it is not surprising
that the warrant issuing parties keep fairly high prices for their warrants. This
way a potential loss can be avoided. However, this still does not explain why
warrant buyers are usually willing to pay higher prices for warrants than for
almost identical call options.
We expected a priori that the prices of the foreign issuers would be higher
than of the Dutch issuer, because the foreign parties have to make more costs
to operate on the Dutch market. This hypothesis is tested in Table 6 where
we perform a regression analysis of the overpricing on each of the three foreign
issuers.
[Please insert Table 6 here]
The regression analysis in Table 6 is carried out for the overpricing for the
Black/Scholes, the Square Root model and the Binomial model. Besides that,
we perform the regression analysis for both the complete samples and the sam-
ple of warrant prices that are calculated with all four options. In all six cases,
we ﬁnd that the warrants from issuer C are signiﬁcantly more overpriced than
the warrants of the Dutch issuer. For issuers B and D we also ﬁnd the expected
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. However, the coeﬃcients for both issuers are only signif-
icant in the regressions for the complete samples. The signiﬁcance completely
disappears in the regressions for the sub samples.
A priori we also expected that overpricing would be negatively correlated
to the warrant trading volume. The idea being that a larger batch would be
sold for a lower price. However, the regression analysis in all six panels shows
that the reverse relationship is true. The log of the trading volume is positively
related to the overpricing, indicating that a higher trading volume is associated
with a higher overpricing. This relationship is signiﬁcant in ﬁve out of the six
panels.
4.2 Transaction costs
When trying to explain the overvaluation it is important to keep in mind that
the buyers of the warrants are generally private investors. According to the
Dutch ﬁnancial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad of January 24, 2002, more
than 70% of the warrant buyers consist of private persons. In the practitioners
literature it is often mentioned that for private persons the transaction costs
are lower for call warrants than for long-term call options. It is not possible to
make a direct comparison of the transaction costs. The reason for this is that
they are charged diﬀerently for call warrants and call options. Transaction costs
for call options are charged per contract. Each contract allows its holder to buy
100 shares of common stock. Transaction costs for warrants are charged in the
s a m ew a ya sf o rs h a r e s . T h a ti sa( s m a l l )ﬁ x e da m o u n ti sc h a r g e da sw e l la s
a percentage of the market value of the order (in Euros). This means that for
call warrants there is no direct relationship with the number of shares that can
be bought. Both for call warrants and for call options diﬀerent amounts apply
between orders placed by phone and Internet orders.
The independent Dutch Internet company ”Belegger.nl” compares transac-
tion costs for a number of large Dutch banks. Based on the information supplied
on their web page (per February 19, 2002) we compare transaction costs between
10call warrants and call options. The results for this comparison are included in
Table 7.
[Please insert Table 7 here]
The minimum order for which transaction costs for shares and warrants are
presented on this web page is 1,000. This is the basis for our comparison. In
Table 7 we compare transaction costs for four diﬀerent scenarios. In all scenarios
we consider call warrants with a warrant-ratio of 0.1. That is 10 call warrants
are needed to buy one share of common stock. We consider four cases: in the
ﬁrst case the warrant price is 0.10 Euro. In the second case it is 0.20 Eurocent,
in the third case it is 0.5 Euro and in the fourth case it is 1 Euro.
In scenario 1 we assume that the warrant price is 0.10 Euro. The order size
of 1,000 Euros would allow the warrant investor to buy 10,000 warrants. If she
would like to take a similar position using options, she would have to buy 10
option contracts. In that case also 1,000 shares can be bought by exercising the
option (10 contracts of 100 shares each). The transaction costs for the warrants
are presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7. The warrant transaction costs
vary between 12 and 19 Euro for phone trade and between 10 and 15 Euro
for Internet trade. The transaction costs for buying 10 option contracts are
presented in columns (4) and (5). The option transaction costs vary between
39 and 71 Euro for phone trade and between 32 and 52 Euro for Internet trade.
With regard to these transaction costs it has to be noticed that the actual
diﬀerence in most cases has to be doubled. Investors ﬁrst have to buy the
warrants or the options and if things go well they have to exercise or sell them.
In columns (6) and (7) we present the diﬀerence of the transaction costs of the
call warrants and the call options as a percentage of the warrant price. From
Table 7 it can be concluded that the largest diﬀerence is for phone trade by ABN
Amro (71 Euro minus 15 Euro is 56 Euro). If this amount is expressed in the
price per warrant it is 0.56 Eurocents per warrant. For a round-trip (buy and
s e l l )t h ea m o u n ti sd o u b l e da n di ti s0 . 0 1 1 2E u r o( =1 . 1 2E u r o c e n t s )p e rc a l l
warrant. In columns (8) and (9) we present the transaction costs as a percentage
of the warrant price. In the example of ABNAmro the diﬀerence of 0.0112 Euro
is divided by the warrant price of 0.1 Euro, resulting in a percentage diﬀerence
of 11.2%. Based on this example it could be concluded that the diﬀerence in
transaction costs between call warrants and call options is large. However, three
remarks are in order. First it has to be remarked that the phone trade of ABN
Amro is the most extreme case. The diﬀerence for both the phone and the
Internet trade of Binck is only 26 Euro, which for a round-trip comes down
to 0.0052 Euro per warrant, resulting in a percentage diﬀerence of only 5.2%
per call warrant. Second, it can be noticed that scenario 1 is the most extreme
scenario. From Table 2 it can be concluded that the average normalized warrant
price is 0.55 Euro, with a median value of 0.47 Euro. Third, even the most
extreme transaction cost diﬀerence is much smaller than the price diﬀerence.
Given an average price diﬀerence between 25 and 30 percent, the price diﬀerence
expressed in the price per warrant is between 2.5 and 3 Eurocents.
In scenario 2 we assume that the warrant price is 20 Eurocents. The warrant
holder needs 10 warrants to buy one share. Assuming an order size of 1,000
Euro, the investor would buy 5,000 warrants. A similar position can be acquired
by buying 5 option contracts. In that case also 500 shares can be bought by
11exercising the option. The transaction costs for the warrants remain unchanged.
The reason for this is that the order size, which determines the transaction costs,
is the same. These transaction costs are presented in columns (2) and (3) in
scenario 2 of Table 7. The transaction costs for buying 5 option contracts are
presented in columns (4) and (5). As in the previous scenario, the diﬀerence in
transaction costs per warrant (for a round-trip) are presented in columns (6) and
(7). Columns (8) and (9) present the transaction costs diﬀerence per warrant as
a percentage of the warrant price. The largest diﬀerence is for phone trade by
ING Bank (34 Euro minus 12 Euro is 22 Euro). If this amount is expressed in
the price per warrant it is 0.0044 Eurocents per warrant. For a round-trip the
amount is doubled and it is 0.88 Eurocents per warrant. Expressed in the price
per warrant this would be 4.4%15. The diﬀerence in transaction costs between
call warrants and call options is still large. However, again it is much smaller
than the price diﬀerence of 25-30% per warrant.
In scenario 3 we assume that the warrant price is 0.5 Euro. The warrant
holder needs 2 warrants to buy one share. Assuming an order size of 1,000
Euro, the investor would buy 2,000 warrants. A similar position can be acquired
by buying 2 options contracts. The transaction costs for the warrants remain
unchanged. From columns (8) and (9) of scenario 3 it can be concluded that in
this case the diﬀerence in transaction costs is negligible. In some cases they are
even lower for options than for warrants. The same conclusion can be reached
from scenario 4.
Although not reported in this paper we have also investigated the transaction
costs for larger order sizes in order to see whether the diﬀerence in transaction
costs diminishes for larger order sizes. We ﬁnd that this is not the case. The
diﬀerence in transaction costs remains to be virtually the same16,17.
Even though transaction costs cannot explain the full overpricing of the call
warrants, it is still possible that they explain a part of the overpricing. In that
case we should ﬁnd a negative relationship between the normalized warrant
price and the overpricing. This hypothesis is tested in Table 6. In this table
we regress the overpricing on the normalized warrant price. We do indeed ﬁnd
a signiﬁcantly negative relationship between overvaluation and the normalized
warrant price. This signiﬁcantly negative relationship is found for all three
models. In all cases it is conﬁrmed for the whole sample as well as for the
sub-sample. An alternative way to test this hypothesis is by regressing the
overvaluation on the moneyness (deﬁned as the ratio of the stock price and the
exercise price). The hypothesis is that a higher moneyness is associated with
a lower overvaluation. This signiﬁcantly negative relationship is also conﬁrmed
in all six regressions. Therefore, it can be concluded that transaction costs can
explain a (small) part of the overvaluation.
150.0088 Euro divided by a warrant price of 0.2 Euro.
16These results are available on request from the authors.
17The Internet company Belegger.nl does not give information on warrant orders smaller
than 1,000 Euros. It may be possible that the transactions cost diﬀerences are larger for such
orders. However, it will still not explain the full price diﬀerence between call warrants and
call options.
124.3 Flexibility
Another advantage of warrants for private investors is that is easier to start
trading warrants than it is to start trading options. In order to trade options it
is necessary to sign a special option agreement with a bank or a broker. This is
not necessary for warrants. Warrants are also more ﬂexible, since they allow an
investor to trade in small amounts. A single option contract entitles its holder
to buy 100 shares. Most warrants that are traded have a warrant-ratio that is
lower than 1. For example, one warrant ”Ahold”, mentioned in the example
in section 2, entitles its holder to buy one tenth of a share. This means that
warrants make it easier to trade in small amounts. Further, a warrant investor
has more ﬂexibility. For example, it is possible for her to buy rights to acquire
150 shares. This is not possible with options. We test whether this ﬂexibility
diﬀerence aﬀects the overpricing. The hypothesis is that more ﬂexibility, i.e. a
lower warrant-ratio, is associated with higher overpricing. In the regressions in
Table 6 we ﬁnd the expected negative relationship between overpricing and the
warrant-ratio. However, this relationship is only signiﬁcant in the regressions
for the Square Root model and the Binomial model. It is not signiﬁcant for the
model of Black and Scholes (1973).
4.4 Bid-ask spread of options
Both in the trading of call warrants and call options bid and ask prices are
used. In our regressions we only use closing prices, since intraday prices are not
available. The closing prices may be bid or ask prices. Since we use information
on the ﬁrst ﬁve trading days for the warrants, the closing prices are very likely
to be ask prices. In case of the options, the closing price may have been a bid
or an ask price. It is highly unlikely that this diﬀerence is capable of explaining
the overpricing of the warrants. The reason for this is that the standard bid-ask
spread for options on Euronext Amsterdam is much less than the overpricing of
the warrants of almost 30%. Besides that, it is equally likely that the closing
price is a bid or an ask price. Therefore we do not believe that a signiﬁcant part
of the overpricing can be explained from this source.
4.5 No possibility for arbitrage
Even though the warrants are overpriced it is not possible for investors to di-
r e c t l yp r o ﬁ tf r o mt h i s .T h er e a s o ni st h a ti ti sn o tp o s s i b l et ow r i t et h ew a r r a n t s
and/or go short in them. Therefore, direct arbitrage is not possible. In this sense
the case for call warrants and call options is much like the case described by
Lamont and Thaler (2001). They study equity carve-outs in US technology
stocks. They ﬁnd a number of cases in which holders of a share of company A
are expected to receive x shares of company B. However, the price of A is less
than x times the price of B. Due to short sale constraints this mispricing is not
eliminated through arbitrage. Lamont and Thaler (2001) argue that the lack
of arbitrage possibilities means that the market is still eﬃcient. However, they
argue (page 4): ”Still, this is market eﬃciency with very wrong prices”.
134.6 Behavioral motives
Standard ﬁnance theory is built on the assumption that investors are indiﬀerent
between ﬁnancial instruments that have the same cash ﬂows. Shefrin and Stat-
man (1993) take a stand against this assumption and argue that some investors
prefer one ﬁnancial product to another because of the way in which identical
cash ﬂows are framed. They attribute the success of covered calls to the ability
of ﬁnancial institutions to frame the cash ﬂows of covered calls in such a way
that they are appealing to diﬀerent types of investors. The case that is presented
in this paper goes one step further. Call warrants and call options not only give
the same cash ﬂows, they are almost identical ﬁnancial instruments. Yet, they
are traded at diﬀerent prices, because they are labeled diﬀerently. The reason
for this is most likely that private investors probably perceive warrants being
diﬀerent from options. For example, the ﬁnancial newspaper Het Financieele
Dagblad of March 16, 2001 writes (translated): ”New this year is the large at-
tention for warrants (..). This product, a kind of option, has the advantage that
the risk is limited to the original investment. With options, investors have the
possibility to engage in the obligation to buy or to sell, which gives an unlimited
r i s k .W i t ht h i sa sag i v e n ,b a n k sh o p et oc o n v i n c ei n v e s t o r sw h od on o tw a n tt o
participate on the ”dangerous” options exchange”. Sem van Berkel, an impor-
tant trader on Euronext Amsterdam in the magazine for the options exchange,
Rokin 5, already made a similar statement in 1995. Van Berkel wrote (trans-
lated): ”Warrants go better with the smart set than options. You can explain
as often as you like that options are used to hedge risks, but you still often hear
that clients have heard or read something about them that they don’t like. It is
diﬀerent with warrants. Apparently it sounds less spooky”. The issuing banks
also actively try to establish a diﬀerent image for call warrants compared to call
options. In the Dutch ﬁnancial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad of March
18, 2000, a manager of one of the warrant issuing banks argues: ”Warrants are
for investors who ﬁnd stocks too boring and options too wild and complicated”.
In this context it also has to be remarked that the issuing banks actively ad-
vertise investing in warrants. According to Het Financieele Dagblad of January
24, 2002 Euronext Amsterdam is also going to start a marketing campaign for
investing in warrants. This is probably also caused by the fact that the ex-
change generates revenues from warrant trading as outlined in the beginning of
this section18. Since there is hardly any advertising for options, the large pop-
ularity of the warrants may also partly be explained by the active marketing
of this ﬁnancial product. Hirshleifer (2001) argues that person-to-person and
media contagion of ideas is important. He argues that people tend to conform
to the judgments and behaviors of others. At least two of the large banks that
a r ea c t i v ei nt h eD u t c hw a r r a n tm a r k e ta r ev e r ya c t i v ei no r g a n i z i n gs e m i n a r s .
They both organize their own seminars and they give lectures at investment
clubs and at the major exchange ”Geldzaken” (”Money Aﬀairs”) that is held
annually in the Netherlands. Such places are excellent sources for the contagion
of ideas. We consider this contagion to be the most probable explanation for
the overpricing of call warrants in relation to call options. The issuing parties
18Besides the 5 Eurocents mentioned in the beginning of this section for each price change,
the exchange collects 1,000 Euro per listed warrant and 500 Euro for each year that the
warrant is listed. Finally, the exchange directly collects transaction costs from parties that
buy warrants.
14on the warrant market apparently have managed to create an image for call
warrants that is diﬀerent from the image of call options. After the ﬁrst group
of private investors adapted this new instrument it most likely spread to other
private persons, thereby creating a niche for call warrants as a unique ﬁnancial
instrument.
5 Use of a questionnaire to investigate the pos-
sible explanations.
In order to further investigate the possible explanations that were put forward
in section 4, we have submitted a questionnaire to the CentERpanel. This
panel, which is administered by CentERdata of Tilburg University, consists of
2,000 households in the Netherlands. The members of these households ﬁll
in a questionnaire at their home computers every week19. The CentERpanel
is representative of the Dutch population. In May 2002 we have submitted a
questionnaire to this panel on the choice between call options and call warrants.
This questionnaire is included in the Appendix. Unfortunately, the number of
respondents that were interested in call options and/or call warrants was fairly
low. In total 41 respondents indicated that they recently bought and/or were
interested in buying call options and/or call warrants. It is useful to notice here
that people in the Netherlands are much less interested in investing, outside
savings accounts and/or the principal residence, than e.g. people in the United
States or the United Kingdom. According to information from CentERdata
only 16% of the respondents have investments in stocks.
In the ﬁrst two questions the respondents were asked whether they either
bought call warrants (call options) during the last year or whether they were
considering buying call warrants (call options) in the year to come. A total of
39 households answered this question aﬃrmative for call options. A mere 19
households gave a positive answer for call warrants. We asked the households
that bought both and/or considered both how the factors described in the pre-
vious section inﬂuenced their choice. We also asked the persons that indicated
only to buy call warrants or call options which factors played a role for them to
only buy or consider call warrants (call options) and not to buy or consider call
options (call warrants). Since only two respondents for call warrants answered
the question, we have not included these results in our paper. The results for
the other two questions are included in Table 8.
[Please insert Table 8 here]
The ﬁrst question in Table 8 deals with the choice between call warrants and
call options. This question was directed at the respondents who both bought
or were interested in buying call warrants and call options. A score of 4 for one
of the factors means that the respondent is neutral for this factor between call
warrants and call options. A score lower than 4 means that the respondent has
a preference for call warrants and a score higher than 4 means a preference for
call options. The average scores for this question are all around 4. Strangely
enough, recommendations of friends and acquaintances scores relatively high for
19More information on the CentERpanel can be found at http://www.centerdata.kub.nl.
15call options (4.25). As can be expected, the ﬂexibility in determining the number
of buying rights gives the highest score for call warrants (3.71). However, all
scores are very close to the neutral score of 4.
The second question in Table 8 is directed at the respondents that are in-
terested in buying call options, but not in buying call warrants. A relatively
high score for this question means that this factor is very important for the
respondent in her preference for call options over call warrants. The factor with
the highest average score is the price of the product on the market (4.62). This
might indicate that the investors in call options realize that call warrants are
overpriced compared to call options. Surprisingly, the second highest score is for
the risk of the product (4.60). This is remarkable, since we would a priori expect
that call options would be associated with a higher risk. Investors in call options
indicate that they are not strongly inﬂuenced by the publicity in newspapers
and magazines (3.14) and recommendations of friends and acquaintances (2.18).
This is in line with our expectations, since we would expect these factors to lead
to high scores for call warrants (see section 4). The factor transaction costs also
gives a low score (2.95). This is also not surprising, since in some circumstances
transaction costs are higher for call options than for call warrants. The overall
picture is that the questionnaire conﬁrms our results from section 4.
6 Summary and conclusions.
Since 1998 the European capital markets have witnessed a large growth in the
number of issues of call warrants. These call warrants are issued by a small
number of large investment banks. We study the pricing of call warrants in
the Dutch capital market. The reason to choose for the Dutch market is that
the options exchange in Amsterdam also features the trading of long-term call
options. This allows us to price the call warrants contingent on the pricing of
these call options. We ﬁnd that on the ﬁrst trading date more than 99% of the
warrants are largely overvalued. Only a small part of the overpricing can be
attributed to rational factors. For example, we ﬁnd that transaction costs are
lower for call warrants that are relatively cheap compared to other call warrants
with the same warrant ratio. However, we also ﬁnd that this argument only
applies to a small part of our sample. Besides that, even in the most extreme
cases, the transaction cost diﬀerence can only explain an overpricing of 5-11%,
while the average overvaluation is between 25 and 30 percent. The lack of
arbitrage possibilities explains that the overpricing cannot be arbitraged away.
However, this still leaves us with the question why investors are willing to pay
more for call warrants than for almost identical call options. We ﬁnd that
the answer lies in behavioral motives. Apparently, ﬁnancial institutions have
managed to create an image for call warrants that is diﬀerent from call options.
This image is responsible for the overpricing of call warrants in relation to call
options.
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A Questionnaire submitted to the CentERpanel
1. Did you buy call warrants during the last year or are you considering to
buy call warrants in the year to come? (yes, no)
2. Did you buy call options during the last year or are you considering buying
call options in the year to come? (yes, no)
• If the answer to both questions 1 and 2 is yes, you can proceed to
question 3.
• If the answer to question 1 is yes, and the answer to question 2 is no,
you can proceed to question 4.
• If the answer to question 1 is no, and the answer to question 2 is yes,
you can proceed to question 5.
• If the answer to both question 1 and question 2 is no, the question-
naire is ﬁnished for you.
3. Suppose that you have a choice between a call warrant and a call option
that both entitle to buy the same share of common stock. Can you please
indicate on a scale how the following factors inﬂuence you choice? (0 =
no opinion; 1 = very strong preference for call warrant; 4 = neutral; 7 =
very strong preference for call option):
• transaction costs
• ﬂexibility in determining the number of buying rights
• price of the product on the market
• recommendations of friends and acquaintances
• risk of the product
• publicity in newspapers and magazines
• size of the bid-ask spread
184. How much do the following factors play a role for you in your decision to
buy or to consider call warrants, but not to buy or consider call options?
Can you please indicate on a scale how the following factors inﬂuence you
choice? (0 = no opinion; 1 = does not play any role; 7 = plays a very
important role):
• transaction costs
• ﬂexibility in determining the number of buying rights
• price of the product on the market
• recommendations of friends and acquaintances
• risk of the product
• not in the possession of an option agreement
• publicity in newspapers and magazines
• size of the bid-ask spread
5. How much do the following factors play a role for you in your decision to
buy or to consider call options, but not to buy or consider call warrants?
Can you please indicate on a scale how the following factors inﬂuence you
choice? (0 = no opinion; 1 = does not play any role; 7 = plays a very
important role):
• transaction costs
• price of the product on the market
• recommendations of friends and acquaintances
• risk of the product
• publicity in newspapers and magazines
• size of the bid-ask spread
19Table 1: Sample selection This table presents the selection of call warrants for our
sample. The call warrants and the underlying stocks are identiﬁed from the oﬃcial
newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Oﬃciele Prijscourant van de Ef-
fectenbeurs. Column (1) presents the underlying stocks. Column (2) presents all the
call warrants that were issued on Euronext Amsterdam in the period from January1,
1999 to December 31, 2001 on underlying shares on which also long-term call options
are available. Column (3) gives the call warrants for which there is no price informa-
tion available in Datastream. The call warrants that are eliminated because there is
conﬂicting information between diﬀerent data sources are included in column (4). Call
warrants for which we do not have at least ﬁve trading days available are presented
in column (5). Column (6) gives the call warrants for which it is not possible to ﬁnd
at least ﬁve days during the ﬁrst ten trading days of the call warrant on which not
at least both a call option with a longer maturityand a call option with a shorter
maturityare being traded. Finally , column (7) gives the ﬁnal sample.
Underlying Original No price Conﬂicting Less than Not enough Final
stock sample information issuance 5 trading options sample
in information days available
Datastream
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ABN Amro 18 3 2 13
Aegon 17 3 6 8
Ahold 11 1 1 9
Akzo 12 2 2 8
ASML 25 5 8 12
DSM 5 1 1 3
Elsevier 15 1 2 1 11
Fortis 13 2 3 5 3 0
Getronics 23 2 6 7 8
Heineken 8 3 5 0
ING 22 4 2 1 5 10
KPN 26 22 4
Numico 13 2 1 8 2
Philips 24 5 1 9 9
Royal Dutch 13 2 1 2 8
TNT Post 4 1 3 0
Unilever 5 5
UPC 15 2 5 7 1
Wolters Kluwer 6 6 0
Total 275 35 5 28 96 111
20Table 2: Summary statistics This table presents the summarystatistics of the
Dutch call warrants issued between January1, 1999 and December 31, 2001. Call
warrants are onlyincluded if theyare at least traded during ﬁve trading day s (these
are days with a positive trading volume). Trading days are only taken into account
if at least one call option with a longer maturityand one call option with a shorter
maturitythan the warrant are traded. Furthermore, call warrants are onlyincluded
if during the ﬁrst 10 trading days at least ﬁve days can be found on which the earlier
mentioned two options are traded. The call warrants and the underlying stocks are
identiﬁed from the oﬃcial newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Oﬃciele
Prijscourant van de Eﬀectenbeurs. The normalized call warrant price represents the
price to buy0.1 share of common stock. The warrant ratio is the number of shares that
can be bought with one call warrant. The moneyness is the ratio of the stock price
and the exercise price on the ﬁrst trading date. The price of the underlying stock, the
exercise price, the time to maturity, the trading volume of the warrants, the warrant
price and the warrant ratio are derived from Datastream. Issuer A refers to the only
Dutch issuing bank (ABN Amro). Issuers B, C, and D refer to the foreign issuers.
The information on the full sample is presented in Panel A. In Panel B information is
presented on the call warrants that are priced using four call options.
Panel A : full sample Issuer
A B C D Total
Number of warrants 26 32 41 12 111
Avg. warrant price (norm) 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.69 0.55
Med. warrant price (norm) 0.51 0.44 0.4 0.68 0.47
Avg. maturity1.41 1.68 2.02 1.33 1.71
Med. Maturity1.48 1.78 1.65 1.41 1.58
Avg. warrant ratio 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.13
Med. warrant ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Avg. trading volume 6516 5966 9717 6314 7518
Med. trading volume 4000 4179 5280 2883 4000
Avg. moneyness 0.9 0.87 0.8 0.89 0.85
Panel B : valuation based on 4 options Issuer
A B C D Total
Number of warrants 13 19 21 6 59
Avg. warrant price (norm) 0.46 0.55 0.65 0.87 0.6
Med. warrant price (norm) 0.36 0.45 0.65 0.76 0.53
Avg. maturity1.4 1.7 1.95 1.25 1.67
Med. Maturity1.39 1.84 1.65 1.38 1.6
Avg. warrant ratio 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.12
Med. warrant ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Avg. trading volume 11133 5044 6654 6638 7121
Med. trading volume 7857 4160 3920 2767 4160
Avg. moneyness 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.97 0.88
21Table 3: Overpricing of the Dutch call warrants for the Black/Scholes model This
table presents the overpricing of the Dutch call warrants issued between January1,
1999 and December 31, 2001. The overpricing is calculated as the average overpricing
over the ﬁrst ﬁve trading days of the warrants. Trading days are only taken into
account if at least one call option with a longer maturityand one call option with a
shorter maturitythan the warrant are traded. Warrants are onlyincluded if during the
ﬁrst 10 trading days at least ﬁve days can be found on which the earlier mentioned two
options are traded. The call warrants and the underlying stocks are identiﬁed from
the oﬃcial newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Oﬃciele Prijscourant
van de Eﬀectenbeurs. The overpricing is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market
price of the warrant and the model price divided bythe market price. Model prices
are calculated using the model of Black and Scholes (1973) corrected for continuous
dividend payments. The price of the underlying stock, the exercise price, the dividend
yield, and the time to maturity of both the options and the warrants are derived
from Datastream. The risk-free interest rate is estimated as the average yield on
government bonds with a maturityof 2 y ears (also from Datastream). The volatility
of the warrants is deﬁned as the implied volatilityof long term call options on the same
stocks. The diﬀerent implied volatilities are weighted in such a waythat the options
that are closest to the call warrants in terms of exercise price and time to maturity
get the highest weight. The information on the full sample is presented in Panel A. In
Panel B information is presented on the call warrants that are priced using four call
options. The signiﬁcance of the averages is tested using a t-statistic. The signiﬁcance
of the medians is tested using the Binomial sign test. *** = signiﬁcant at the 1%-level;
** = signiﬁcant at the 5%-level; * = signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.
Panel A : full sample
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 13 29.29*** 14.35 3.24 58.13 28.87*** 13
Aegon 8 35.35*** 15.8 22.16 64.82 27.11*** 8
Ahold 9 33.62*** 27.15 7.38 95.98 29.41*** 9
Akzo 8 17.22*** 9.91 1.86 35.67 15.67*** 8
ASML 12 23.24*** 10.41 8.33 40.91 20.33*** 12
DSM 3 6.15 14.76 -9.88 19.17 9.17 2
Elsevier 11 33.70*** 21.09 5.18 79.23 31.10*** 11
Getronics 8 43.45*** 39.84 19.66 138.36 26.04*** 8
ING 10 28.97*** 13.78 10.05 51.57 28.14*** 10
KPN 4 36.36*** 24.94 13.01 67.36 24.94 4
Numico 2 69.74* 55.51 30.49 109 69.74 2
Philips 9 29.74*** 14.57 12.89 51.85 26.46*** 9
Royal Dutch 8 29.91*** 21.96 5.84 73.28 26.53*** 8
Unilever 5 29.91*** 16.09 6.82 46.6 34.75** 5
UPC 1 23.59 23.59 23.59 23.59 1
Total 111 31.35*** 20.15 -9.88 138.36 25.55*** 110
22Panel B : valuation based on 4 options
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 9 24.10*** 10.47 3.24 35.76 25.44*** 9
Aegon 6 36.22*** 17.35 23.81 64.82 27.11** 6
Ahold 3 18.44** 12.45 8.5 32.41 14.42 3
Akzo
ASML 11 23.91*** 10.64 8.33 40.91 20.39*** 11
DSM
Elsevier 3 26.39*** 9.37 15.83 33.7 29.66 3
Getronics 5 51.16** 49.76 19.66 138.36 28.82** 5
ING 5 25.38*** 16.15 10.05 51.57 19.45** 5
KPN 4 36.36*** 24.94 13.01 67.36 32.53 4
Numico
Philips 5 32.70*** 11.9 16.75 43.95 39.38** 5
Royal Dutch 2 28.38*** 5.08 24.79 31.97 28.38 2
Unilever 5 29.91*** 16.09 6.82 46.6 34.75** 5
UPC 1 23.59 23.59 23.59 23.59 1
Total 59 29.71*** 19.65 3.24 138.36 24.96*** 59
23Table 4: Overpricing of the Dutch call warrants for the Square Root model This
table presents the overpricing of the Dutch call warrants issued between January1,
1999 and December 31, 2001. The overpricing is calculated as the average overpricing
over the ﬁrst ﬁve trading days of the warrants. Trading days are only taken into
account if at least one call option with a longer maturityand one call option with a
shorter maturitythan the warrant are traded. Warrants are onlyincluded if during the
ﬁrst 10 trading days at least ﬁve days can be found on which the earlier mentioned two
options are traded. The call warrants and the underlying stocks are identiﬁed from
the oﬃcial newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Oﬃciele Prijscourant
van de Eﬀectenbeurs. The overpricing is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market
price of the warrant and the model price divided bythe market price. Model prices are
calculated using the Square Root version of the Constant Elasticityof Variance model
of Cox and Ross (1976) corrected for continuous dividend payments. The price of
the underlying stock, the exercise price, the dividend yield, and the time to maturity
of both the options and the warrants are derived from Datastream. The risk-free
interest rate is estimated as the average yield on government bonds with a maturity
of 2 years (also from Datastream). The volatility of the warrants is deﬁned as the
implied volatilityof long term call options on the same stocks. The diﬀerent implied
volatilities are weighted in such a waythat the options that are closest to the call
warrants in terms of exercise price and time to maturityget the highest weight. The
information on the full sample is presented in Panel A. In Panel B information is
presented on the call warrants that are priced using four call options. The signiﬁcance
of the averages is tested using a t-statistic. The signiﬁcance of the medians is tested
using the Binomial sign test. *** = signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; ** = signiﬁcant at the
5%-level; * = signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.
Panel A : full sample
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 13 38.76*** 32.19 3.27 117.02 28.97*** 13
Aegon 8 35.75*** 16.4 19.13 65.06 27.56*** 8
Ahold 9 44.88*** 44.31 8.84 152.73 31.07*** 9
Akzo 8 38.08*** 29.34 3.28 93.84 35.29*** 8
ASML 12 27.58*** 16.95 8.45 71.15 23.93*** 12
DSM 3 12.87* 12.05 -0.57 22.71 16.47 2
Elsevier 11 45.16*** 42.17 5.02 157.5 33.94*** 11
Getronics 8 41.50*** 38.93 17.81 134.17 26.60*** 8
ING 10 30.80*** 14.79 10.09 51.74 30.81*** 10
KPN 4 35.17*** 22.92 13.06 61.03 33.29 4
Numico 2 98.26** 68.75 49.65 146.87 98.26 2
Philips 9 37.83*** 19.49 15.84 71.35 39.79*** 9
Royal Dutch 8 36.26*** 34.46 6.04 114.61 28.55*** 8
Unilever 5 30.19*** 16.49 6.51 46.61 34.77** 5
UPC 1 20.59 20.59 20.59 20.59 1
Total 111 38.25*** 30.42 -0.57 157.5 29.65*** 110
24Panel B : valuation based on 4 options
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 9 24.30*** 10.5 3.27 35.78 26.41*** 9
Aegon 6 36.65*** 17.17 24.2 65.06 27.56** 6
Ahold 3 18.65*** 12.32 8.84 32.47 14.65 3
Akzo
ASML 11 28.44*** 17.5 8.45 71.16 27.55*** 11
DSM
Elsevier 3 26.52*** 9.38 15.98 33.94 29.41 3
Getronics 5 50.38** 47.95 18.67 134.17 29.61** 5
ING 5 26.15*** 16.47 10.09 51.74 20.12** 5
KPN 4 35.17*** 22.92 13.06 61.03 33.29 4
Numico
Philips 5 33.50*** 12.77 16.83 47.36 39.79** 5
Royal Dutch 2 28.55*** 4.89 25.1 32.01 28.55 2
Unilever 5 30.19*** 16.49 6.51 46.61 34.77** 5
UPC 1 20.59 20.59 20.59 20.59 1
Total 59 29.92*** 19.87 3.27 134.17 27.55*** 59
25Table 5: Overpricing of the Dutch call warrants for the Binomial model with
discrete dividend payments This table presents the overpricing of the Dutch call
warrants issued between January1, 1999 and December 31, 2001. The overpricing is
calculated as the average overpricing over the ﬁrst ﬁve trading days of the warrants.
Trading days are only taken into account if at least one call option with a longer
maturityand one call option with a shorter maturitythan the warrant are traded.
Warrants are only included if during the ﬁrst 10 trading days at least ﬁve days can
be found on which the earlier mentioned two options are traded. The call warrants
and the underlying stocks are identiﬁed from the oﬃcial newspaper of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, De Oﬃciele Prijscourant van de Eﬀectenbeurs. The overpricing is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market price of the warrant and the model price
divided bythe market price. Model prices are calculated using the Binomial Model for
American type options with estimated dividends. The price of the underlying stock,
the exercise price, the realized dividends, and the time to maturityof both the options
and the warrants are derived from Datastream. The estimated future dividends are
set equal to the realized dividends of the last year before the trading day. The risk-free
interest rate is estimated as the average yield on government bonds with a maturity
of 2 years (also from Datastream). The volatility of the warrants is deﬁned as the
implied volatilityof long term call options on the same stocks. The diﬀerent implied
volatilities are weighted in such a waythat the options that are closest to the call
warrants in terms of exercise price and time to maturityget the highest weight. The
information on the full sample is presented in Panel A. In Panel B information is
presented on the call warrants that are priced using four call options. The signiﬁcance
of the averages is tested using a t-statistic. The signiﬁcance of the medians is tested
using the Binomial sign test. *** = signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; ** = signiﬁcant at the
5%-level; * = signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.
Panel A : full sample
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 13 24.35*** 12.47 2.47 50.27 25.30*** 13
Aegon 8 33.19*** 16.1 18.81 62.91 25.54*** 8
Ahold 9 31.75*** 26.76 5.11 92.71 28.65*** 9
Akzo 8 19.23*** 10.59 3.01 38.6 18.39*** 8
ASML 12 23.26*** 10.34 8.41 40.35 20.67*** 12
DSM 3 -0.01 11.17 -11.56 10.75 0.61 2
Elsevier 11 31.95*** 20.23 3.98 75.22 30.17*** 11
Getronics 8 45.86** 41.58 19.05 141.12 26.39*** 8
ING 10 28.31*** 14.21 9.39 50.51 28.81*** 10
KPN 4 38.56** 26.45 14.03 71.26 26.45 4
Numico 2 65.68 54.46 27.17 105.18 65.68 2
Philips 9 29.37*** 14.08 12.86 51.24 27.77*** 9
Royal Dutch 8 26.36*** 21.41 4.08 69.41 23.53*** 8
Unilever 5 26.13** 15.45 7.97 46.29 19.99** 5
UPC 1 19.45 19.45 19.45 19.45 1
Total 111 29.56*** 21.37 -11.56 141.12 25.82*** 110
26Panel B : valuation based on 4 options
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 9 19.89*** 9.35 2.47 29.16 24.88*** 9
Aegon 6 34.18*** 17.5 21.04 62.91 25.54** 6
Ahold 3 16.81* 12.43 6.48 30.6 13.36 3
Akzo
ASML 11 23.94*** 10.55 8.41 40.35 21.03*** 11
DSM
Elsevier 3 24.62** 10.65 12.48 32.41 28.97 3
Getronics 5 51.60* 50.97 19.05 141.12 28.11** 5
ING 5 24.00** 16.39 9.39 50.51 18.20** 5
KPN 4 38.56** 26.45 14.03 71.26 34.48 4
Numico
Philips 5 31.80*** 11.75 15.23 43.19 36.79*** 5
Royal Dutch 2 23.53*** 1.15 22.71 24.34 23.53 2
Unilever 5 26.13** 15.45 7.97 46.29 19.99** 5
UPC 1 19.45 19.45 19.45 19.45 1
Total 59 27.88*** 20.29 2.47 141.12 24.03*** 59
27Table 6: Regression results This table presents the regression analysis of the over-
pricing of the Dutch call warrants issued between January1, 1999 and December 31,
2001. The overpricing is calculated as the average overpricing over the ﬁrst ﬁve trad-
ing days of the warrants. Trading days are only taken into account if at least one call
option with a longer maturityand one call option with a shorter maturitythan the
warrant are traded. Warrants are onlyincluded if during the ﬁrst 10 trading day s at
least ﬁve days can be found on which the earlier mentioned two options are traded.
The call warrants and the underlying stocks are identiﬁed from the oﬃcial newspaper
of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Oﬃciele Prijscourant van de Eﬀectenbeurs.
The overpricing is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market price of the warrant
and the model price divided bythe market price. Model prices in Panels A and B are
calculated using the model of Black and Scholes (1973) corrected for continuous divi-
dend payments. Model prices in Panels C and D are calculated using the Square Root
version of the Constant Elasticityof Variance model of Cox and Ross (1976) corrected
for continuous dividend payments. Model prices in Panels E and F are calculated us-
ing the Binomial model of Cox et al. (1979) corrected for discrete dividend payments.
The discrete dividend is estimated as the actual dividend in the year before the ﬁrst
trading day. The price of the underlying stock, the exercise price, the dividend yield,
the discrete dividend payments, and the time to maturity of both the options and the
warrants are derived from Datastream. The risk-free interest rate is estimated as the
average yield on government bonds with a maturity of 2 years (also from Datastream).
The volatilityof the warrants is deﬁned as the implied volatilityof long term call op-
tions on the same stocks. The diﬀerent implied volatilities are weighted in such a way
that the options that are closest to the call warrants in terms of exercise price and
time to maturityget the highest weight. The normalized call warrant price represents
the price to buy0.1 share of common stock. The warrant ratio is the number of shares
that can be bought with one call warrant. The moneyness (M.ness) is the ratio of the
stock price and the exercise price on the ﬁrst trading date. The warrant-ratio and the
trading volume of the warrants are also derived from Datastream. Issuer A refers to
the onlyDutch issuing bank (ABN Amro). Issuers B, C and D refer to the foreign
issuers. The information on the full sample is presented in Panels A, C and E. In
Panels B, D and F information is presented on the call warrants that are priced using
four call options. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (White) are reported
between square brackets. *** = signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; ** = signiﬁcant at the
5%-level; * = signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.
28Panel A: dependent variable : % overpricing (Black/Scholes warrant prices)
obs : 111
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.41 -0.192 0.1
Std. Err. [0.043] [0.051]
t-test 9.53*** -3.76***
Coef. 0.435 -0.204 -0.137 0.11
Std. Err. [0.050] [0.054] [0.085]
t-test 8.70*** -3.77*** -1.61
Coef. 0.167 0.108 0.26 0.089 0.24
Std. Err. [0.019] [0.031] [0.045] [0.039]
t-test 8.79*** 3.48*** 5.78*** 2.28**
Coef. 0.922 -0.726 0.27
Std. Err. [0.150] [0.163]
t-test 6.15*** -4.45***
Coef. 0.149 0.023 0.13
Std. Err. [0.031] [0.006]
t-test 4.81*** 3.83***
Panel B: dependent variable : % overpricing (Black/Scholes warrant prices)
obs : 59
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.381 -0.141 0.07
Std. Err. [0.061] [0.069]
t-test 6.25*** -2.04**
Coef. 0.417 -0.147 -0.271 0.08
Std. Err. [0.076] [0.071] [0.191]
t-test 5.49*** -2.07** -1.42
Coef. 0.224 0.016 0.184 0.027 0.18
Std. Err. [0.019] [0.031] [0.061] [0.047]
t-test 11.79*** 0.52 3.02*** 0.57
Coef. 0.92 -0.71 0.24
Std. Err [0.300] [0.325]
t-test 3.07*** -2.18**
Coef. 0.178 0.017 0.07
Std. Err [0.045] [0.008]
t-test 3.96*** 2.13**
29Panel C: dependent variable : % overpricing (Square Root model warrant prices)
obs : 111
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.561 -0.341 0.16
Std. Err. [0.065] [0.078]
t-test 8.63*** -4.37***
Coef. 0.606 -0.362 -0.247 0.17
Std. Err. [0.075] [0.083] [0.131]
t-test 8.08*** -4.36*** -1.89*
Coef. 0.191 0.102 0.376 0.134 0.26
Std. Err. [0.019] [0.031] [0.064] [0.057]
t-test 10.05*** 3.29*** 5.88*** 2.35**
Coef. 1.481 -1.299 0.42
Std. Err. [0.196] [0.211]
t-test 7.56*** -6.16***
Coef. 0.143 0.034 0.14
Std. Err. [0.040] [0.008]
t-test 3.58*** 4.25***
Panel D: dependent variable : % overpricing (Square Root model warrant prices)
obs : 59
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.387 -0.134 0.06
Std. Err. [0.059] [0.067]
t-test 6.56*** -2.00**
Coef. 0.43 -0.142 -0.334 0.07
Std. Err. [0.074] [0.068] [0.198]
t-test 5.81*** -2.09** -1.69*
Coef. 0.23 0.014 0.197 0.02 0.21
Std. Err. [0.020] [0.031] [0.061] [0.048]
t-test 11.50*** 0.45 3.23*** 0.42
Coef. 0.965 -0.75 0.27
Std. Err [0.286] [0.309]
t-test 3.37*** -2.43**
Coef. 0.206 0.014 0.05
Std. Err [0.055] [0.009]
t-test 3.75*** 1.56
30Panel E: Dependent variable : % overpricing (Binomial model warrant prices)
obs : 111
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.396 -0.193 0.1
Std. Err. 0.043 0.051
t-test 9.21*** -3.78***
Coef. 0.425 -0.207 -0.158 0.11
Std. Err. 0.051 0.054 0.076
t-test 8.33*** -3.83*** -2.08**
Coef. 0.148 0.11 0.273 0.086 0.26
Std. Err. 0.02 0.031 0.045 0.037
t-test 7.40*** 3.55*** 6.07*** 2.32**
Coef. 0.946 -0.77 0.3
Std. Err. 0.15 0.163
t-test 6.31*** -4.72***
Coef. 0.137 0.023 0.12
Std. Err. 0.031 0.006
t-test 4.42*** 3.83***
Panel F: Dependent variable : % overpricing (Binomial model warrant prices)
obs : 59
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.369 -0.146 0.07
Std. Err. 0.064 0.071
t-test 5.77*** -2.06**
Coef. 0.417 -0.155 -0.375 0.09
Std. Err. 0.079 0.073 0.172
t-test 5.28*** -2.12** -2.18**
Coef. 0.208 0.01 0.194 0.013 0.2
Std. Err. 0.02 0.029 0.064 0.043
t-test 10.40*** 0.34 3.03*** 0.3
Coef. 0.959 -0.772 0.27
Std. Err 0.308 0.333
t-test 3.11*** -2.32**
Coef. 0.162 0.017 0.07
Std. Err 0.046 0.009
t-test 3.52*** 1.89*
31Table 7: Transaction costs for call warrants and call options Transaction costs
(in Euro) for call warrants and call options are presented for three diﬀerent scenarios.
In all scenarios it is assumed that an investor purchases call warrants for a total value
of 1,000 Euro. The transaction costs for the warrants are included in columns (2)
and (3) of each scenario. Each warrant entitles her to buy0.1 shares of common
stock. It is also assumed that the investor buys call options that entitle her to buy
the same number of shares. In scenario 1 the warrant price is 0.1 Euro. Therefore,
the investor buys 10,000 warrants. A similar position can be acquired by buying 10
option contracts (each allowing her to buy100 shares). See columns (4) and (5) for
the option transaction costs of scenario 1. In scenario 2 the warrant price is 0.2 Euro,
allowing the investor to buy5,000 warrants. The transaction costs are the same as
in scenario 1 and are included in columns (2) and (3). An equivalent position can
be acquired bybuy ing 5 option contracts. The transaction costs for this position are
included in columns (4) and (5) of scenario 2. In scenario 3 the warrant price is 0.5
Euro. In this case an equivalent position can be taken bybuy ing 2 option contracts.
Finally, in scenario 4 the warrant price is 1 Euro. Here an equivalent position can be
acquired bybuy ing 1 option contract. In both scenarios the transaction costs for the
option contracts are included in columns (4) and (5). Columns (6) and (7) in each
scenario present the diﬀerence in transaction costs expressed in the price per warrant.
Columns (8) and (9) give this diﬀerence as a percentage of the warrant price. The
transaction costs are derived from the Internet company"Belegger.nl" on February
19, 2002. P = phone trade. I = Internet trade. N.A. = not available.
Scenario 1 : Warrant price is 0.1 Euro
Bank Transaction Transaction Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
costs costs per warrant per warrant
warrants options (in Euros) (percentage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PIPI P I PI
ABN Amro 15 10 71 52 0.0112 0.0084 11.2 8.4
Alex 17 12 44 38 0.0054 0.0052 5.4 5.2
Binck 15 15 41 41 0.0052 0.0052 5.2 5.2
ING Bank 12 10 68 N.A. 0.0112 N.A. 11.2 N.A.
Intereﬀekt 19 N.A. 45 N.A. 0.0052 N.A. 5.2 N.A.
Postbank 19 12 68 49 0.0098 0.0074 9.8 7.4
SNS Bank 15 13 45 45 0.006 0.0064 6 6.4
VEB 13 12 39 32 0.0052 0.004 5.2 4
32Scenario 2 : Warrant price is 0.2 Euro
Bank Transaction Transaction Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
costs costs per warrant per warrant
warrants options (in Euros) (percentage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PIPI P IPI
ABN Amro 15 10 36 26 0.0084 0.0064 4.2 3.2
Alex 17 12 25 19 0.0032 0.0028 1.6 1.4
Binck 15 15 23 23 0.0032 0.0032 1.6 1.6
ING Bank 12 10 34 N.A. 0.0088 N.A. 4.4 N.A.
Intereﬀekt 19 N.A. 23 N.A. 0.0016 N.A. 0.8 N.A.
Postbank 19 12 34 25 0.006 0.0052 3 2.6
SNS Bank 15 13 23 23 0.0032 0.004 1.6 2
VEB 13 12 25 20 0.0048 0.0032 2.4 1.6
Scenario 3 : Warrant price is 0.5 Euro
Bank Transaction Transaction Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
costs costs per warrant per warrant
warrants options (in Euros) (percentage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PI PI P I PI
ABN Amro 15 10 18 13.5 0.003 0.0035 0.6 0.7
Alex 17 12 17 14 0 0.002 0 0.4
Binck 15 15 13 13 -0.002 -0.002 -0.4 -0.4
ING Bank 12 10 16.5 N.A. 0.0045 N.A. 0.9 N.A.
Intereﬀekt 19 N.A. 14 N.A. -0.005 N.A. -1 N.A.
Postbank 19 12 17 13 -0.002 0.001 -0.4 0.2
SNS Bank 15 13 14 14 -0.001 0.001 -0.2 0.2
VEB 13 12 16 12.5 0.003 0.0005 0.6 0.1
Scenario 4 : Warrant price is 1 Euro
Bank Transaction Transaction Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
costs costs per warrant per warrant
warrants options (in Euros) (percentage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PIPI P IPI
A B N A m r o 1 51 01 51 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 2
Alex 17 12 20 14 0.006 0.004 0.6 0.4
Binck 15 15 11 11 -0.008 -0.008 -0.8 -0.8
ING Bank 12 10 13 N.A. 0.002 N.A. 0.2 N.A.
Intereﬀekt 19 N.A. 14 N.A. -0.01 N.A. -1 N.A.
Postbank 19 12 14 11 -0.01 -0.002 -1 -0.2
SNS Bank 15 13 14 14 -0.02 0.002 -0.2 0.2
VEB 13 12 13 10 0 -0.004 0 -0.4
33Table 8: Questionnaire results from the CentERpanel This table contains the most
important results of the questionnaire that was submitted to the CentERpanel of Cen-
tERdata of Tilburg Universityin May2002. This panel consists of 2,000 households
in the Netherlands. The members of these households ﬁll in a questionnaire at their
home computers everyweek. The complete questionnaire is included as an Appendix.
Question 3: Suppose that you have a choice between a call warrant and a call option
that both entitle to buythe same share of common stock.
Indicate on a scale from 1 (= verystrong preference for call warrant)
to 7 (= verystrong preference for call option).
Total: 17 respondents.
1234 56 7N o a n s .a v g .
recommendations of friends and acquaintances 1028 22 11 4 . 2 5
risk of the product 1121 001 20 4 . 0 6
p r i c e o f t h e p r o d u c t o n t h e m a r k e t 2128 11 20 3 . 9 4
t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s 2217 11 21 3 . 8 8
p u b l i c i t yi n n e w s p a p e r s a n d m a g a z i n e s 2101 022 00 3 . 8 8
size of bid-ask spread 2216 30 21 3 . 8 8
ﬂexibilityin determining the number of buy ing right s4035 21 20 3 . 7 1
Question 5: How much do the following factors playa role for y ou in y our decision
to buyor to consider call options, but not to buyor consider call warrants?
Indicate on a scale from 1 (= veryimportant role)
to 7 (= does not playanyrole).
Total: 22 respondents.
1234 56 7N o a n s .a v g .
p r i c e o f t h e p r o d u c t o n t h e m a r k e t 3220 21 021 4 . 6 2
risk of the product 1223 55 22 4 . 6
size of bid-ask spread 2425 22 14 3 . 6 1
p u b l i c i t yi n n e w s p a p e r s a n d m a g a z i n e s 4732 24 00 3 . 1 4
t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s 5633 04 01 2 . 9 5
recommendations of friends and acquaintances 8831 11 00 2 . 1 8
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